DGCX Xinkangjia eyewash collapse: The whereabouts of 13 billion funds remain a mystery, 2 million victims lose everything?

Recently, the Chinese investment circle was shocked by a sensational fraud case: a platform named "DGCX 鑫慷嘉" impersonated the Dubai Gold and Commodities Exchange (DGCX) and illegally raised as much as 13 billion RMB in just two years, resulting in over 2 million victims. This case not only has a massive scale but also reveals how criminals exploit emerging concepts and human vulnerabilities to weave seemingly beautiful wealth traps. The Public Security Bureau of Taojiang County, Hunan Province has issued a warning, reminding the public to remain vigilant and not to participate in such unauthorized investment activities.

1. The True Face of DGCX Xinkangjia: Shell Company and False Packaging

According to reports, on June 26, 2025, an online investment platform named Xin Kang Jia DGCX suddenly closed all withdrawal channels, and a large number of users discovered that their assets in their accounts had been frozen or cleared, making it impossible to withdraw funds. This incident quickly fermented on social media platforms, attracting widespread attention. Although there is currently no authoritative institution that has released accurate data on the number of victims and the financial losses, it is rumored among investors that this incident may involve a capital scale of up to 13 billion yuan, with the number of victims possibly exceeding 2 million.

According to some publicly disclosed information, as early as 2019, Xin Kang Jia had sold oil filtering equipment worth 200,000 yuan to a certain enterprise, and this transaction was later packaged as "signing a five-year strategic cooperation agreement with CPC Corporation"; in March 2021, the project started operating under the name Guizhou Xin Jia Big Data Co., Ltd. Although the company claimed to have a registered capital of 30 million, the actual payment amount was zero, and it had long been listed as having abnormal operations, fitting the characteristics of a "shell company."

In May 2023, the platform launched DGCX Xin Kang Jia Big Data Exchange, claiming to be the "official branch of Dubai Gold and Commodities Exchange (DGCX) in China," and self-claimed to have reached cooperation with several state-owned enterprises such as China National Petroleum and China COSCO Shipping. The platform endorsed itself by releasing forged contracts, official letters, screenshots of its official website, and other materials to strengthen its "regular army" image.

In fact, the platform has no affiliation or business connection with DGCX; the entire qualification system is disguised under the cloak of "international finance." The real DGCX has publicly issued statements multiple times denying any authorization or cooperation with it and warning users to be cautious of counterfeit platforms. It is rumored that the founder, Huang Xin, left a message in the member group after fleeing overseas. While the authenticity of this content cannot be independently verified, it has been widely circulated in the community, further intensifying investors' anger.

2. MistTrack On-chain Analysis: The Fund Flow of the Ponzi Scheme

SlowMist ('s anti-money laundering tracking analysis system MistTrack conducts in-depth tracing of blockchain addresses related to this case. On-chain behavior indicates that the scheme may have constructed a complex multi-level funding structure, where funds flow in from a centralized entry point and then flow out after multiple transfers, initially exhibiting characteristics commonly associated with Ponzi schemes.

Currently, approximately 800,000 user deposit addresses have been analyzed and identified, involving a funding scale of up to 1.5 billion USD. It is important to emphasize that this data is based on technical analysis and mining of publicly available on-chain information and does not represent the complete funding paths and final facts of the project. The statistical results may contain errors and are for reference only.

User funds inflow: The source of funds mostly comes from the hot wallets of centralized exchanges, which are then distributed to numerous addresses in whole amounts (such as 1000, 2000 USDT, etc.). It is speculated that this may be the operation of the project direction receiving RMB from users, and then uniformly withdrawing coins from the exchange and distributing USDT.

Internal fund aggregation on the platform: After multiple "user addresses" receive USDT, the funds are transferred through 1 to 2 layers into a collective address controlled by the platform. These addresses serve as "relay layers" or "aggregation nodes," unifying the user's "deposit funds" / "membership fees."

Withdrawal and Fees: The aggregation address will disperse funds to one or more addresses, some of which are only active for 1 to 2 days, showing the "rotation rhythm" of fund operations. Most of the funds eventually return to the user deposit addresses of some exchanges, presenting a one-to-many format, suspected to be user profit withdrawals. More significantly: In most transfers, the amount received by the target address is about 10% less than the initiated amount, which may indicate the existence of some "withdrawal fees."

Authorization mechanism: There are custom authorization behaviors among a large number of on-chain addresses, which suggests that project operators have adopted a batch authorization control mechanism for the convenience of automated program operations. This structure is also closer to the platform's permission management approach.

3. Scam Model Analysis: High Returns, Multi-Level Marketing and Withdrawal Obstacles

"DGCX Xin Kang Jia" is suspected to be a funding scheme that combines "Ponzi core + multi-level marketing structure", using virtual asset investment as a pretext and stablecoins as the payment method, raising funds through the method of "referring others" to join, with specific techniques including:

Multi-level marketing mechanism: Establish a brigade-style 9-level structure system, with the hierarchy consisting of Commander, Army Leader, Division Leader, etc., and set clear promotion standards and rebate ratios. For example, participants can upgrade to Squad Leader after paying to become a member and recommending 3 people, with a reward of 10 USDT for each successful referral; to reach the rank of Commander, one must develop a team of nearly 20,000 people and have 50 direct subordinates, earning a referral reward of 150 USDT per person and a guaranteed monthly salary of 12,000 USDT. This mechanism presents a typical pyramid-like dissemination path, incentivizing participants to continuously develop subordinates and driving continuous fund inflow through promotion rewards.

Fake trading and backend manipulation: Various fake trading interfaces are displayed on its official website and APP, including gold, crude oil, indices, etc., claiming to provide international market conditions and real-time profits and losses, guiding users to recharge USDT for high-leverage trading, while all account data is actually controlled by the platform's backend.

High Returns and Rebate Bait: The platform claims to utilize big data technology to conduct futures trading in gold, oil, and foreign exchange in the Middle East, promising investors returns of up to 2% per day. For example, if a member invests $100,000, they could earn $2,000 daily, accumulating $60,000 monthly. "3 Days to Break Even, 7 Days to Double", "100% Profit Commission", and "VIP Internal Arbitrage Signals" are the main talking points that attract users to continue investing. The platform also regularly creates some successful withdrawal screenshots and investment "Earnings Rankings" to create an atmosphere of "real money-making", forming a strong herd effect.

Withdrawal thresholds are being increased layer by layer: According to feedback from investors, on June 25, Xin Kang Jia experienced a situation where withdrawals were not possible, and the next day it was confirmed that the system had crashed. The response given by the platform was that "the company was defined by regulatory authorities as tax evasion, and all account funds were frozen, making withdrawals impossible." Users who wish to withdraw need to pay taxes according to 10% of their holding amount, and withdrawals over 100,000 need to queue for more than 30 working days. After paying taxes, a daily return of 1% can be generated, and withdrawals can be made after accumulating 100 USDT, with a withdrawal fee of 50%. Before absconding, the platform also transferred about 1.8 billion USDT to a Cayman offshore shell company account through Tornado Cash.

IV. Regulatory Failure and Investment Self-Protection: A Bloody Lesson

In fact, before the platform collapsed, several local public security agencies and financial supervision authorities had issued risk warnings, including the Ping Shan County Public Security Bureau, the Yangshan County Public Security Bureau, the Taojiang County Public Security Bureau, the Heyuan Rural Commercial Bank, and the Hunan Provincial Financial Office, all indicating that the platform was suspected of illegal fundraising and high-risk trading. However, due to the platform's implementation of an invitation code system to control registration, it widely penetrated through group fission, offline lectures, and other methods, combined with rhetoric such as "national-level projects" and "central enterprise cooperation," resulting in a large number of middle-aged and elderly people and users from lower-tier markets being deeply involved, leading to a continuous inflow of funds even after regulatory warnings were issued in various places.

Currently, it is reported that some core technical personnel of the platform and leading agents have been controlled by the public security authorities. The authorities have sealed several accounts related to the case and frozen funds of approximately 120 million yuan. However, the main suspect, Huang Xin, is suspected of transferring funds to the Cayman Islands through a USDT mixer, making recovery much more difficult. Victims have also posted deposit screenshots on social media, lamenting, "In the end, I put my mortgage and education funds on the line, and now I can't even get back my principal."

The collapse of "DGCX Xin Kang Jia" has left 2 million people at a loss, reminding us that high returns = high risks is not just a slogan, but a necessary lesson. To avoid becoming the next victim, investors should keep the following three key checkpoints in mind:

Be alert for abnormally high returns: Any project that guarantees "steady profits" or returns that are abnormally high compared to the market should prompt you to stop and think first.

Verify the platform's regulatory qualifications: Confirm whether the platform is under official regulation, especially when it claims to be associated with international organizations, and verify on the official website.

Avoid pyramid schemes and withdrawal obstacles: As long as the model requires "developing downlines" or "increasing investment to withdraw," it should be regarded as a red flag. Netizens are also calling in discussion forums: "Even if it's a familiar friend recommending, you should verify it yourself."

Conclusion:

The exposure of the "DGCX Xin Kang Jia" scam case once again reveals the enormous dangers of illegal fundraising and financial fraud. The core of such Ponzi schemes is not innovation, but rather the precise use of a hybrid model of on-chain payments and offline promotion, combined with false foreign identities and fake government endorsements to create a sense of cross-border legitimacy. In today's environment where emerging concepts such as digital currencies and stablecoins are continuously emerging, criminals exploit information asymmetry and the public's speculative psychology to commit fraud. Only by improving financial literacy and carefully verifying authenticity can we protect our hard-earned assets amid the noise of information.